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McMullen’s book has a problem it sets out to solve, namely, what it was that
attracted a seventeenth-century samurai of low, rural origins in the pageant
of ancient court life that is displayed in Genji monogatari. McMullen, however,
approaches this problem on so lavish a scale, that his book should be required
reading for anyone who is interested in any aspect of the history of Japan in
the Edo Period, and perhaps also for those who, though not Japan specialists,
are interested in the perennial problem of using literary sources to establish
non-literary facts.
McMullen’s study is the culmination of a lifelong study of Kumazawa
Banzan, which began with his dissertation Kumazawa Banzan: The life and
thought of a seventeenth-century Japanese Confucian (Cambridge 1969),
and progressed through a number of later publications in English and Japanese,
of which his Genji gaiden. The Origins of Kumazawa Banzan’s Commentary
on the Tale of Genji (1991), which contains Banzan’s original notes on Genji
monogatari, with notes, translation, and introduction, deserves special mention.
The book is not a mere antiquarian exercise. At one level, it is a passionate
attempt to define such values as idealism and humanism and to find them
attested in a context completely different from the European one, where they
were originally conceived. In other words, McMullen’s study poses and tries
to answer the question of the universality of the Japanese experience. In this,
he follows in the footsteps of Bellah’s Tokugawa Religion and in those of a
good number of Japanese scholars, foremost amongst whom we find Maruyama
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The core section of the book are the chapters on Banzan’s involvement with
Genji monogatari (Pt. IV). McMullen leads up to this with Parts I–III. Part I,
called “The Landscape of the Age,” is a general introduction in which he
discusses the status quaestionis and his own methodology, and gives synopses
of the history of Confucianism from the Period of the Warring States up till
and including Wang Yang-ming, of Japanese society from the late Sengoku
till the early Edo Period, of the religious situation in Japan, of court culture
and Genji monogatari, of earlier Neo-Confucian interpretations of the Book
of Odes (Shih ching), and of the intellectual world of early Tokugawa Japan.
In Part II, “A Warrior’s Life,” McMullen treats Banzan’s career in the service
of Ikeda Mitsumasa, daimyô of Okayama (Bizen), and the life of semi-exile
that followed, to the extent that Banzan was still concerned with what happened
in Bizen. In Part III, “A View of the World,” McMullen deals with Banzan’s
writings and intellectual development after he has retired from active service
with Mitsumasa in 1657 – the years which he spent in Kyoto, Akashi, and
Yata. The final section (Part V), “Questions on the Great Learning,” is con-
cerned with Banzan’s Daigaku wakumon and the motives he had for writing
this work which so displeased the authorities that he had to spent his final
years under house arrest in Koga.
McMullen does a fine job, interweaving a biographical account of Banzan’s
life with an intellectual-historical account of the development of his thought.
In McMullen’s hands, Banzan no longer is an “eclectic thinker” with doubtful
intellectual credentials and of uncertain affiliation who addressed sundry
topics, but a person whose life, activities, reading, and thinking mutually
influenced each other and form a coherent whole. “I seek a unity all-pervading”
(Lun-yü XV.2) is the first sentence of the book, and in this case the basic
methodological statement.
McMullen does give a short account, style bibliographie raisonnée, of
Banzan’s major works (pp. 174–180), but only two books by Banzan are
discussed at any length and systematically, namely Genji gaiden and Daigaku
wakumon. All his other works, such as the voluminous Shûgi Washo and
Shûgi gaisho, such dialogues as Miwa monogatari, or his commentaries on
various Classics, are liberally quoted – indeed, McMullen’s command of the
Kumazawa Banzan zenshû is impressive – but they are not treated as such.
The heart of the book is Part IV, which deals with Genji monogatari. As
McMullen points out, Banzan’s commentary has been in bad repute ever
since Motoori Norinaga wrote that Banzan “extract[s] locutions serially from
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Confucian pronouncements in accordance with [his own] fancy.” (p. 400) On
the whole, this verdict has sufficed to shy off any kokubungakusha who
might have had an incipient interest in Genji gaiden, with the notable exception
of Noguchi Takehiko, while specialists in Confucian studies never bothered
to take an interest in the text because it was labelled a commentary on a work
of Japanese literature. McMullen, however, more than makes up for these
omissions. He has restored Genji gaiden to its rightful place as an important
document in the history of Japanese thought.
Actually, in his choice of Genji monogatari, Banzan was in tune with his
Confucian colleagues. All Confucian scholars and Sinologists of the Edo
Period agreed that the apogee of Japanese culture had been reached under the
emperors Uda, Daigo, and Murakami. During their reigns, the emperor ruled,
culture flourished, and “The Way” was practised in Japan. Banzan locates
the action of the novel in exactly this same period (p. 333). The point where
Banzan differed from his colleagues was, that he saw The Way depicted in a
novel, where his colleagues tended to support their conviction with references
to the Court Academy, examinations, and Sugawara no Michizane’s Chinese
poetry.
From a Confucian point of view, there were several things wrong with
Genji monogatari: it was a work of fiction, not of fact; it contained lewd
stories of sexual intercourse, illicit affairs, and adultery; and it was written by
a woman, who by this very fact had never taken part in the weighty affairs of
state. Banzan’s choice of Genji monogatari entailed that he had to find
satisfactory solutions for these problems. He had, for reasons we will come
to in a moment, fallen in love with the novel, but in order to justify this
emotional response, he had to make a case.
 McMullen carefully analyses the strategies Banzan deploys to meet the
objections listed above. The first stratagem was, that Banzan decided to treat
Genji monogatari as if it were a factual record. This involved him in a lot of
tortuous argument. Thus, we find him visiting spots “where Genji had been”
in Suma when he himself was living in the same place, now called Akashi, in
semi-banishment, and collecting local traditions: “The young cherry trees
that he [ = Genji] planted survive too, their seed never having died out. Had
he never existed, neither would these traditions.” (pp. 299–300). He also
condemns attempts to explain certain features of Genji monogatari as literary
figures showing the novelist’s art, even where such explanations were part of
the commentatorial tradition (pp. 310–311). Banzan was astute enough not to
join the fruitless search of medieval commentators for historical figures who
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with the opinion of Sanjônishi Kin’eda that “[the Genji’s] factuality was in
the style of Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s Shih chi” (p. 315).
Banzan also introduced the Chinese concept of yü-yen (J. gugen), interpreting
the story as essentially true but foisted on fictive characters (roman à clef
[pp. 312–313]), and even took the step of defining “essentially true” as
“morally true”: “Even if Lady Akashi did not exist, there is no inherent
impossibility in the existence of a worthy woman such as she. Thus there is
benefit to be derived from imagining her to exist and treating her as a copy
book for other women.” (pp. 315–316)
As regards the larger problem of using literary works as a source of factual
information, it is interesting to see that Banzan asked the right question:
“The Genji is a fictitious tale based on amorousness, so how can it be quoted
as evidence for the zither?” (p. 309) He did not, however, pursue the matter
to the end, but settled for the easier, and more congenial assumption that at
some level of factuality the text was a true and factual account.
The next criticism Banzan had to meet, was that Genji monogatari was an
erotic tale, filled with love affairs. Most of Banzan’s Confucian contemporaries,
amongst whom we find Hayashi Razan, Yamazaki Ansai and his disciples,
Muro Kyûsô, Kaibara Ekiken, and Yamaga Sokô, put it into the same category
as Ise monogatari and maintained that Genji monogatari was corruptive and
devoid of any “serious moral purpose.” (pp. 59-60). Banzan could not deny
the facts, but he did find ways to counter the conclusions. On the one hand,
he claimed that there were good reasons why Murasaki had included all these
love affairs. Her real intent was to write “a record of ancient rites, music, and
customs,” but if she had done just that, nobody would have bothered to read
her work, and it might have been lost (p. 320). The love interest was a ruse
on the part of Murasaki Shikibu. In a metaphor derived from Chuang-tzu,
Banzan calls it a “fishing line” (p. 320) or a “fishing bait” (p. 318, 323, 390),
though the word actually employed in Chuang-tzu is ch’üan (Morohashi, Dai
Kan Wa jiten VIII: 25995) – neither “line” nor “bait,” but a bamboo contraption
used for catching fishes, that one throws away after the fish has been caught.
The image may be completely different, but we have here another instance of
the well-known ploy of miscere utile dulci.
This explanatory theory also proved expedient in order to exculpate Genji
from his most terrible moral offense, i.e., his affair with his father’s consort
Fujitsubo. This was so grossly improbable an affair, Banzan maintained, that
any well-intentioned reader should grasp immediately that this could not be
true, and hence, not central to what the author intended to convey (p. 321).
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have spotted, moreover, with help of earlier commentaries, that the story was
in essence the Chinese story, told in Shih chi, of Lü Pu-wei who fathered the
first Chinese emperor, Ch’in Shih-huang-ti, on the King of Ch’in (p. 314).
The stories are still there, of course, but they have been rendered innocuous.
The reader is free to ignore them as inessential, and to concentrate on higher
things.
On the other hand, Banzan also developed a contrary strategy, which claimed
that the amorous stories were essential, in that they gave insight into human
feelings, and especially into the most intense of all human feelings, sexual
love. Such insight he regarded as a necessary prerequisite for any ruler,
including lowly administrators like Banzan himself and his fellow-samurai.
The interpretative strategy Banzan employs here was derived from the ancient
Chinese lore which surrounds the Book of Odes. This lore, in short, maintains,
that the songs, and especially the songs of the various countries (kuo-feng),
were collected and presented to the king of Chou in order to let him know
the feelings of the people. Some of the more straightly laced Neo-Confucian
thinkers such as Chu Hsi had a problem with this explanation, because a
number of the Odes, defined as the “debauched odes” or the “Odes of [the
States] Cheng and Wei,” were a bit over the edge. Banzan, however, taking
comfort from the thought that Confucius himself had included them into his
final selection of the odes, maintained that “For the superior man, the [de-
bauched] songs of Cheng and Wei are more to be treasured than the [correct]
‘Hsiao ya’ and ‘Ta ya’” (p. 322). Of course, Banzan did not approve of the
illicit love affairs which form the substance of these odes, but in the context
of his commentary he uses them as a justification for Genji monogatari
itself: “It is my belief that the prevailing opinion held by scholars of the Tale
of Genji as a licentious, corrupting, and dirty book stems from their failure to
arrive at the inner significance of the Odes as a means for understanding the
correctness and incorrectness of human attitudes” (pp. 322–323).
Apart from these two strategies, which McMullen calls intentionalist (p.
323), Banzan also gave a “historicist” explanation of the question why the
stories were there: in view of the time and place in which the tale is set, the
topic of “love” could not have been avoided. It was part of the landscape (p.
324). In an interesting development of this idea, Banzan goes on to argue
that in ancient times, when the Japanese were still martial and warlike, love
(and love poetry) were beneficial because they soothed “the fierce heart of
the warrior”; it was “the ‘Way’ for governing the state” (p. 325). Later on,
however, “From the time of Genji and the others, [love poetry] gradually
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The third reproach Banzan had to deal with, was that the novel had been
written by a woman. This was a definite minus. When Hayashi Razan decided
to write a commentary on a work of classical Japanese literature, he chose
Tsurezuregusa, because, as he explained in his preface, it was one of the few
works around written by a man. Banzan was almost as bad. In the preface of
Genji gaiden he writes that “Murasaki Shikibu’s father, Tametoki, was a
man of erudition and talent, and had written a draft intended as a sequel to
the national histories [i.e. the Rikkokushi, which stop in 887. W.J.B.], and it
is said that Shikibu took this and wrote it up as this novel” (p. 315). “Said,”
by whom? McMullen introduces this quotation with the words “he adduced
the theory,” but does not state from where Banzan got it.
The overall impression is that Banzan, since he had decided to like the
novel, more or less ignored the fact that its author was a woman. Although
McMullen remarks that “Banzan was almost certainly more constructive
towards the women in his circle than his prescriptive writings would suggest”
(p. 373), what emerges from the pages McMullen devotes to the topics of
“Women” and “Marriage” (pp. 363–373) in connection with Genji monogatari
is much of a muchness. McMullen may claim that “Banzan’s views on
women are far more liberal and compassionate” than those expressed in
Onna daigaku (p. 372), and that Banzan may have “noted with satisfaction
that ‘wives, daughters, or sisters of my fellow-aspirant friends’ had been
inspired by his Precepts for Women (Joshi kun) to read the Classic of Filial
Piety and Four Books” (p. 373), but what Banzan did not do was write a few
words in praise of the woman who wrote the novel he loved so much. His
praise is reserved for the novel’s characters, especially for Genji himself.
The necessity to deploy these various stratagems Banzan had brought upon
himself, by his decision to study and propagate the novel. He was obviously
infatuated with Genji monogatari. Why? In a short text, Soku Sensei dôdan,
addressed to his collaborator Nakanoin Michishige, which according to Mc-
Mullen probably dates from before 1673, he writes “... some time ago I
derived exceptional benefits from reading the Tale of Genji. ... Perhaps because
it is in kana and concerns Japan, I derived exceptional benefit in acquiring
knowledge of human feelings, more than from the Cheng and Wei poems [in
the Book of Odes]” (p. 300). The year 1672 or 1673 was also the time when
Michishige began writing his commentary on Genji monogatari, titled Genji
kikigaki, and sending it section by section to Banzan for his comments.
Banzan’s comments on Michishige’s commentary in turn became the basis
of his own Genji gaiden. Their cooperation endured for five years or more,
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A “secret Genji commentary” by Banzan is mentioned for the first time in a
letter that dates from sometime between 1680 and 1683 (pp. 305–306). In
other words, Genji gaiden is the fruit of approximately ten years of Genji
study, under the guidance of a court noble who was not only a good friend,
but who also belonged to a family that had a tradition of Genji scholarship
(pp. 291–295).
“Knowledge of human feelings,” however, was only one of the things
which Banzan appreciated in the novel. Basically, the novel had opened his
eyes to an alternative for his own society which had once actually existed in
Japan. A society which was more cultured, yet more frugal; which lived in
harmony with the natural environment, instead of being about to destroy it;
which was ruled by ritual rather than by law, and still practised the ancient
rites and music; which set store by education (p. 333). McMullen takes up
these various points both systematically (pp. 332–373) and through a discussion
of Banzan’s appreciation of the characters of the novel (pp. 374-399).
The conclusion McMullen reaches at the end of the chapters dealing with
Genji monogatari is, that “The ideal that Banzan abstracted from the novel
represented an inversion of his perception of his own militarized, authoritarian,
and unbenevolent society. His advocacy of the novel was an act of protest”
(p. 406).
As is already announced in the title of his book, “protest” and its concomitant
concepts “idealism” and “humanism” are extremely important to McMullen.
The fact that he attaches so much importance to these concepts and uses
them throughout as his preferred analytical tools, situates his book in a
polemical context. This context is, briefly, whether the Confucianism of the
Edo Period was goyô gakumon, the obsequious servant of the military regime
of the bakufu, or opposed it, and secondly, whether it should be regarded as a
purely Japanese phenomenon, or exemplifies universal historical tendencies.
Basing himself on his case study of Banzan, McMullen takes clear positions
in both these issues.
“Protest,” as McMullen defines the concept, implies a tension with present
reality, and the ability to distance oneself from one’s own society. In order to
be able to protest, one must have some sort of alternative in mind, an ideal
which one deems viable, and preferable to what is being done in actual fact.
In order to protest, one must also have a fairly strong and independently
minded personality, be an “autonomous subject,” as McMullen phrases it.
Finally, for protest to be more than a quixotic and inconsequential act of
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referring to values and precedents. The set of values Banzan adhered to,
McMullen defines as “humanist.” “Humanism is ... anthropocentric in its
assumptions, ... implies the dignity and the basic equality of human beings as
ends in themselves, ... In sociological terms, [it] favours achievement rather
than ascription, universalism rather than particularism. Politically, humanism
prefers meritocracy to the exercise of power on the basis of hereditary status”
(pp. 11–14) .
In these terms, Confucianism, including the Confucianism of Tokugawa
Japan, is a humanism; no doubt about it. This made Confucianism an awkward
tool for the bakufu to use, and a potentially dangerous tool, at that. The
bakufu, as a military organisation, definitely did believe in using people as
tools, and from top to bottom, the bakufu was based on ascription; it was
aristocratic to the core, and birth decided. Hence, from the beginning of the
Tokugawa bakufu, most Confucians dissented and quite a few protested. It is
only a few pages, but in these, McMullen takes this discussion back to
ancient China, where he points out the arising opposition between a body of
military-Legalist and a body of civil, Confucian doctrine (pp. 14–21). Fortu-
nately for the Far-East, on the whole the latter won out, but both options
remained on the books – quite literally so. The core curriculum may have
consisted of the Confucian Classics, but the military classics and Legalist
writings, too, were available, studied, commented upon, and printed, also in
Tokugawa Japan, and scholars were aware of the differences and incompati-
bilities of these two streams in their intellectual heritage. If someone should
want to protest, he did not have far to go to find appropriate ammunition. It
was lying there in the form of nearly two millennia of articulate polemics.
The interesting thing about Banzan is, that he was not satisfied with this, but
brought a new, Japanese source into the fray, Genji monogatari.
McMullen himself is somewhat diffident about introducing the word “pro-
test” in this context, apparently because he fears that it might be seen as the
intrusion of a European concept, which was not “available to early Tokugawa
Japanese” (p. 11). He also enters upon a lengthy discussion of “individuality”
(pp. 21–30), in the course of which he opposes “the Confucian concept of
individuality [which] was rather weak” to the “radical autonomy” which the
individual has been able to achieve in the West (p. 28). Since, in the end,
Kumazawa Banzan did protest and does not give the impression of being
unduly hampered by a weak concept of individuality (“arrogant from a youth
up,” was how his daimyô Mitsumasa described him [p. 72]), in the context of
the book the point is not really relevant.
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The same applies to the discussion about “protest.” Perhaps the word “protest”
did not exist, but call the phenomenon to which McMullen refers “remon-
strance,” and throughout East Asia, in all phases of its history, brave remon-
strators can be found. One of the words commonly used to translate “protest”
is kôgi. Look it up in the dictionary, and one soon finds the following quotation,
dating from a Han Dynasty source: “Remonstrance begins with compliant
words; in its second stage one engages in counter argument (kôgi), and in the
final stage, one dies for one’s principles” (Chung ching, quoted in Morohashi
V: 11889-11). Remonstrance was considered as essential for the well-being
of the state. Its servants must point out what was wrong, were it the behaviour
of the emperor himself, and if it cost them their lives, their praise was sung
by later generations. Mitsumasa himself reminds his vassals of this obligation
(p. 109; cf. also p. 146). When Banzan was remonstrating with his daimyô in
Okayama (Ch. 3 is titled “Remonstration,” and elsewhere McMullen speaks
of Banzan’s “brave Confucian remonstration” [p. 156]), or when he wrote
his Daigaku wakumon, he was doing his duty, and he had a tradition in
which he stood. There is no reason not to call his actions protest.
In other words, we may conclude with McMullen that protest could exist,
was part of the Confucian heritage, actually did occur in the case of Banzan,
and that as a consequence, he has succeeded in what he calls “the main aim”
of his book, i.e., “to establish the presence in early Tokugawa history of
idealism and protest, phenomena whose occurrence there is not usually argued”
(p. 14). The meta-discussion in which he embeds his argument, is important
in its own right, but not very relevant to his case or his subject.
The same applies to the other meta-discussion McMullen takes up, which is
the nihonjinron problem of Japan’s uniqueness. In other words, is it possible
to describe Banzan’s thought and actions as instances of universal historical
tendencies. The most interesting aspect of this question is, whether Banzan
saw himself in this light.
As McMullen makes abundantly clear, Banzan’s own answer would have
been “yes.” The world he knew was narrow, confined as it was to East-Asia,
but Banzan leaves no doubt that he considered Japan as an integral part of
that world, and that the rules that applied elsewhere also applied in Japan.
Banzan was fully familiar with this world. From the ancient Chinese Sages,
court aristocrats and bakufu dignitaries to the lowly farmers in Bizen and
Ômi – he knew them all, and consciously located his actions and ideas in this
broad perspective. In the well-known argument about Japan versus China,
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came down squarely on the universalistic side: China is the centre, and there
are no fundamental differences between China and Japan. “China is the
teacher land within the four seas. Her contribution to Japan is especially
great. The paths of rites and music; ... right down to crafts and technical
skills; not one of them has not reached us and been learnt from China” (p.
205). He developed two lines of argument to explain how this situation could
have come about. One is an ingenious argument, partly ontological and partly
geographical, and hinges on the fact that, though Japan is not in the centre
but “inclines towards the east, because she is mid-way between north and
south, the material force of the four seasons is in general equal to that of
China. ... [The Japanese people], like those of China, receive human Nature
completely, and their bright virtue is illumined” (p. 206). The other argument
is historical, and is based on the legend of T’ai-po, scion of the future royal
house of Chou, who came to Japan and “taught the morality of human
relationships, rituals, ancestor worship, and marriage” (p. 208) – in short, did
for Japan what the ancient Sages did for China. For this reason, the people
came to revere him as a god and “called him the Supreme God who Shines in
the Sky” (p. 209). In so many words, Banzan identifies T’ai-po with Amaterasu,
and regards the imperial house as being of Chinese descent. And not only the
imperial house; the samurai class, too, descended from T’ai-po or from other
Chinese immigrants, which explains why they are one cut above those Japanese
of autochthonous ancestry (pp. 210–212). One of the reasons why Banzan
was so much taken in by the imperial court as portrayed in Genji monogatari
was also, that he saw it as the last repository of the ancient Chinese ritual and
cultural order, adapted to Japanese circumstances (pp. 352–353).
Although Banzan did believe in a special place for the samurai, he did not
close his eyes to the needs of the people. He comments favourably on passages
in Genji monogatari where Genji deigns to take cognizance of lesser mortals
(pp. 347–350; 395–396). The years he had spent in the countryside in Ômi
during his youth (pp. 74–79), and his experiences as an administrator in
Bizen (pp. 104–108) had given him ample opportunity to acquaint himself
first-hand with the living conditions of the peasantry. “They, too, are men,”
he writes, in the context of a description of the iniquities of tax collection,
and he comments angrily on the fact that someone who tries to do something
for the peasants – as he did in Bizen, after the disastrous flood of 1654 – is
reviled by his fellow-samurai as being “too compassionate to the people”
(pp. 251–252).
Banzan maintained that “Since Chinese, Japanese, and the barbarians of
Japonica Humboldtiana 7 (2003)
West, South, North and East are all people born with Heaven and Earth as
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their father and mother, they are all brothers” (p. 186; cf. pp. 192–193, p.
212). Originally, men had lived together as brothers, in an egalitarian society
(p. 190). When social hierarchies arose, they did so because one or other
individual possessed moral virtue or expert knowledge, or was born with a
better kind of material force (pp. 192–194). The realm belonged to the realm
(tenka wa tenka no tenka nari), not to its ruler as his private possession.
Hierarchies were justified only if those above fulfilled their obligations towards
the people, whose “well-being remained the ultimate principle” (pp. 194–195).
These ideas may seem extreme for a Japanese Confucian living in the seven-
teenth century. On the other hand, they were all part of the Confucian tradition.
That Banzan was not overly inhibited by bounds of caste and country, and
thought on a larger scale than Japan alone, is also evident from his discourse
on the Great Learning. Daigaku wakumon was prompted by his fear of a
Manchu invasion. This fear turned out to be groundless, but Banzan’s argument,
based as it was on Japan’s earlier experiences with the Mongols, was not
unfounded. In the same way as the Mongols had tried to invade Japan a few
years after they had succeeded in conquering the whole of China, the Manchu,
who had conquered Taiwan in 1662 and had finally occupied Southern China
in 1681, might well try to do the same. He was strengthened in this apprehension
by certain ideas he had about periodicity in history. Every five hundred
years, great upheavals would occur (p. 191), and around 1686 such a five
hundredth year was close at hand (pp. 414–415).
As he began writing Daigaku wakumon, Banzan apparently decided “to
throw it all out.” He did not only ring the alarm in regard to the Manchu,
preach military preparedness, and reprimand those in power, including Shogun
Tsunayoshi, for their moral short-comings, but followed this up with a wealth
of suggestions for political and social improvement: opening the channels of
communication and appointing people of talent (pp. 422–424); relieving pov-
erty and eliminating wastage (pp. 424–427); improving the environment (pp.
427–429); emptying the cities and returning the samurai to the land (pp.
429–431); instituting rites, music, and education (pp. 431–435); and sending
down courtiers from Kyoto to live in the country and to civilize the inhabitants
of the fiefs through their teaching and example (pp. 435–438). This is as far
as McMullen excerpts the text, but it contains more, such as a plea for doing
away with the quota for foreign trade and reopening the port of Hirado
(Section 14; Nihon shisô taikei 30: Kumazawa Banzan, pp. 444–445), and
proposals to abolish both the ban on Christianity (with the argument that it
was not forbidden in China) and the terauke system, which only served to
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enrich the Buddhist establishment (Sections 15 and 16; ibid., pp. 445–446).
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At the time, the bakufu may have considered Banzan’s suggestions to be out
of place and reacted accordingly, but nearly a century after Banzan’s death,
in the fourth month of Tenmei 8 (1788), Daigaku wakumon was printed (of
all places, in Akashi), and as far as we know, nothing untoward happened to
the publisher.
There is no doubt that within the limits of his own world, Banzan was a
universalistic and even cosmopolitan thinker, and was not inclined to make
Japan into a special case. If one does not believe in grand schemes of universal
historical development, and fortunately McMullen does not, this is about as
far as one can go. The only remaining step one can take is to see whether one
can find parallels for Banzan in Europe, in order to bring him “closer to
home.” In his final chapters, “A Wider View” and “Kumazawa Banzan in
History,” McMullen attempts to do as much, and trots out two English patron
saints, John Locke (pp. 469–471) and William Cobbett (pp. 472–481). For
someone who has not been raised on Rural Rides, the result is less then
enlightening. If one is casting about for parallels, why not take Montaigne?
There we have another country squire with some administrative experience,
who also wrote in a loose and prolix style about any number of topics, and he
has the same habit Banzan has, of intermingling quotations from the classics
with his personal experiences and things people told him. The question is,
what these “distant parallels” (p. 469) ultimately teach us.
In the above, I have hardly done justice to this immensely rich book. I have
glossed over Part II, which is in itself a fascinating case study of the problems
a daimyô faced when he decided to push through a reform programme in his
fief. The definition of the aim of the reform, the ideological and political
constraints that shape the formulation of the programme, the interference by
bakufu officials, the practical problem of obtaining cooperation within the
fief, which hinges on the choice between employing homines novi or using
the established vassals (fudai) to execute the reforms – all the usual topics
come up, through the highly articulate and detailed personal records of the
two central figures, Ikeda Mitsumasa and Banzan.
Another thing I have omitted is McMullen’s contributions to straightforward
intellectual history. Of great interest in this connection, apart from his explo-
ration of Banzan’s ideas in Part III, is his treatment of Banzan’s study under
Nakae Tôju (pp. 79–85) and of his attempts to further Tôju’s brand of Neo-
Confucianism, Shingaku, once he was himself securely established in Okayama
(pp. 99–102). He not only preached the doctrine to his daimyô, but also
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founded a school and a Shingaku chapter in Okayama, called Hanabata Kyôjô,
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where “every morning and evening like-minded friends ... practised the arts,
expounded learning, and were frugal and warm [towards each other]” (p.
100). After a few years, however, Shingaku came under a cloud. Hayashi
Razan hinted darkly at links between Shingaku, Christianity, and the plot of
Yui Shôsetsu (pp. 117–118). High officials of the bakufu warned Mitsumasa
against “the assembly of large numbers for the purpose of Confucian Studies”
(p. 118). Under such pressure, both Mitsumasa and Banzan eventually found
it wiser to dissociate themselves both from the followers of Shingaku and
from its central ideas (pp. 121–122). It is an intriguing chapter in the history
of Confucianism in the early Edo Period.
Finally, I could have paid more attention to the environmental issue, about
which Banzan held attractive and definite ideas (see especially pp. 239–245).
I decided not to do so, first, because a review can only be so long, and
second, because I felt that in doing so I would detract attention from what I
consider the two major achievements of McMullen’s book. The first of these
is, that McMullen has succeeded in drawing an integrated portrait of Banzan
as a man and Banzan as a thinker. The second is, that McMullen, through his
restoration of the text and through his meticulous analysis of the contents of
Genji gaiden, has succeeded in validating it as a cardinal clue to Banzan’s
thought and personality, and as a major document in the history of thought of
the Edo Period.
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